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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A police officer arrested Peter Clarke, without warrant, for an alleged misdemeanor
committed outside the officer’s presence. The police officer searched him and found marijuana,
drug paraphernalia, and a trace amount of methamphetamine in a syringe. The State charged
Mr. Clarke with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of
paraphernalia.
Mr. Clarke moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his warrantless arrest and
search.  Among  other  arguments,  he  contended  Article  1,  Section  17  of  the  Idaho  Constitution
prohibited warrantless misdemeanor arrests unless the misdemeanor was committed or attempted
in the police officer’s presence. The district court rejected this argument. The district court
refused to “go there” and rule certain misdemeanor arrests were constitutionally prohibited
because, in part, “Supreme Court’s not been too kind to district judges lately in their opinions,
and I can’t imagine what they would say about me if I were to be the first to go there, so I’m not
going to.” Accordingly, the district court denied Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress.
Mr. Clarke proceeded to trial. In her closing argument, the prosecutor misrepresented the
evidence pertaining to Mr. Clarke’s knowledge of the methamphetamine inside the syringe—the
only contested element at trial. The jury found Mr. Clarke guilty as charged.
Mr. Clarke now appeals. He contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress, and he asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting the evidence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 2, 2016, the State alleged Mr. Clarke committed the crime of possession of a
controlled substance, amphetamines, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.25–
2
26.) In separate citations, the State alleged Mr. Clarke committed three misdemeanors for
possession of marijuana, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3), possession of drug paraphernalia,
in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A(1), and battery, in violation of I.C. § 18-903. (R., pp.23–24.)
According to the probable cause form submitted by Kootenai County Police Officer Michael
Hanson:
I  was  flagged  down  while  at  the  Honeysuckle  Boat  Launch  by  Taylor  V.  Dan.
Dan informed me she had been harrassed [sic] by a male. Dan also told me the
male had grabbed her butt twice without permission. Dan said it had been
unwanted and she wished to pursue charges against the male. I checked the area
and located a male who exactly matched Dan’s description. I contacted the male,
later identified as Peter O. Clarke, who confirmed Dan’s story and admitted to
grabbing her butt. I placed Clarke under arrest for I.C. 18-903 Battery. While
conducting a search of Clarke’s backpack, I located syringes, a baggy of
marijuana, and a baggy containing several small chunks of a white crystalline
substance. I informed Clarke he was also being charged with I.C. 37-2732(c )(I)
Possession of a Controlled Substance, I.C. 37-2732(c )(3) Possession of
Marijuana, and I.C. 37-2734A(l) Possession of Paraphernalia. While at the jail, a
partially filled syringe containing a white substance was located inside Clarke’s
right shoe. I tested the white crystalline chunks using a NIK-A field test kit, which
flashed a presumptive positive for Amphetamines.
(R., pp.10–11.) This arrest occurred at approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 1, 2016. (R., p.10.)
Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for possession of
methamphetamine (instead of amphetamine as originally alleged in the complaint) and bound
Mr. Clarke over to district court. (R., pp.37–39, 40; see also Aug. R., Prelim. Hr’g Tr.)
Mr. Clarke moved to suppress all evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest. (R., pp.45–46.)
Shortly thereafter, the State charged Mr. Clarke by Information with felony possession of
methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia, and misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.47–48; see also R., pp.60–61 (Amended
Information).) Mr. Clarke pled not guilty. (R., p.58.)
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Mr. Clarke then filed a brief in support of his motion to suppress, and the State responded
in opposition. (R., pp.65–77, 80–87.) Mr. Clarke replied. (R., pp.91–93.) In his briefing,
Mr. Clarke argued his arrest was unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because these constitutional
provisions prohibited a police officer from conducting a warrantless arrest of an individual for a
misdemeanor committed outside the officer’s presence. (R., pp.66–71, 72–75.) Due to his
unlawful seizure, Mr. Clarke argued the district court should suppress all evidence obtained from
Officer Hanson’s search incident to arrest and his subsequent search at the jail.1 (R., pp.45, 77.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Clarke’s motion. (R., pp.95–98; see generally
Tr., p.5, L.3–p.45, L.25.) Officer Hanson and Mr. Clarke testified. (Tr., p.13, L.6–p.19, L.25,
p.20, L.12–p.28, L.12.) The facts elicited from their testimony are as follows. On August 1,
2016, Officer Hanson was parked on the side of the road in the Honeysuckle Beach area.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.8–12, Ls.17–18.) A woman, identified as Ms. Dan, approached his car to report a
harassment at the beach. (Tr., p.14, Ls.13–21.) Officer Hanson took her report. (Tr., p.14, Ls.22–
23.) Ms. Dan told Officer Hanson that an unknown male made “advances towards her,” “sat
down next to her,” and “ended up touching her on the butt” “twice.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.1–17.)
Ms. Dan also told Officer Hanson that she had given the man her phone number. (Tr., p.18,
Ls.21–24.) This interaction between Ms. Dan and the male occurred around 1:30 p.m. or 2:00
p.m. that day. (Tr., p.25, Ls.7–9, p.26, Ls.16–23.) Ms. Dan described the man to Officer Hanson
as “a black male with a beard, approximately 30 to 40 years old, wearing a muscle shirt and
1 Mr. Clarke also argued Officer Hanson lacked probable cause for the arrest. (R., pp.75–76.) In
addition, Mr. Clarke argued the five-hour delay between the misdemeanor’s alleged commission
and his warrantless arrest violated I.C. § 19-603(6), which allowed a police officer to conduct a
warrantless arrest for an alleged battery, but only if “upon immediate response to a report” of the
crime’s commission. (R., pp.71–72.)
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orange shirt and black shorts with a black backpack and carrying a brown sack.” (Tr., p.16,
Ls.11–14.) Officer Hanson “remembered somebody matching that description” while he was at
boat launch before his contact with Ms. Dan. (Tr., p.16, Ls.11–22.) About one minute after
leaving Ms. Dan, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Hanson found the man who he believed to
match Ms. Dan’s description (later identified as Mr. Clarke). (Tr., p.16, L.23–p.17, L.11, p.18,
Ls.14–21.) Officer Hanson testified that Mr. Clarke admitted to touching Ms. Dan’s butt, but
Mr. Clarke believed it was consensual. (Tr., p.17, Ls.15–24.) Officer Hanson then arrested
Mr. Clarke and searched him. (Tr., p.18, Ls.4–7, p.18, L.25–p.19, L.7.) Officer Hanson did not
have a warrant. (Tr., p.19, Ls.2–3, Ls.6–7.)
The district court issued an oral ruling at the end of the suppression hearing. The district
court first determined Officer Hanson had probable cause to believe Mr. Clarke committed a
misdemeanor battery. (Tr., p.39, L.2–p.40, L.2.) The district court also ruled Officer Hanson
complied with I.C. § 19-603(6) and, even if the statute was violated, “the remedy isn’t
suppression of the evidence,” relying on State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884 (2015). (Tr., p.40, Ls.3–
20, p.43, Ls.7–15.) Turning to the constitutional violations, the district court reasoned:
Suppression of the evidence is the remedy only when there is a
Constitutional violation, so what makes up a Constitutional violation? At 158
Idaho . . . Page 884 [in Green] the majority opinion says, quote In the context of
the Federal Constitution and its interpreting case law, an arrest is lawful if officers
have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their
presence even if such arrest does not comply with the statutes governing arrest.
So  is  this  a  case  of  a  crime  committed  in  their  presence?  You  know,  I
don’t think so. Does that make it automatically a violation of the Constitution? I
don’t think so. And part of the reason is that obviously this section of [I.C. § 19-
603] has been in existence for quite some time. There are frequent violations of
protection orders, violations of no contact orders, assaults and battery, frequent
domestic violence assaults and battery, probably not that many stalkings and not
that many second degree stalking cases, but all the other cases listed in there,
those things happen every day even in the least busy judicial district, and the
constitutionality of that has apparently never been tested, so I am—Justice Jones,
Justice Warren Jones in his concurring opinion in Green says, “while Green’s
5
arrest was properly supported by probable cause under the Constitution, it
violated  the  statute,”  so  at  least  in  that  phrase  Justice  Jones  doesn’t  limit  it  to  a
crime being committed in their presence, and so I don’t know if the portion of the
majority under [page] 887 in their presence is determinative. It’s kind of just
discussed in passing. It—probably because they found that this was, in Green,  a
crime committed in their presence, same page, 887. “Therefore, having witnessed
Green driving the vehicle, the police officer had probable cause to believe Green
had committed an offense in the officer’s presence,” so I think that’s a factor that
just didn’t need to be addressed in Green.
(Tr., p.43, L.18–p.45, L.5.) After reasoning Green did not address the legal question here, the
district court ruled:
It may well be that this is a great argument, but I’m not going to be the district
court judge that decides all assaults, batteries, domestic assaults or batteries,
violation of protective order and violation of no contact orders that occur in the
state of Idaho which almost universally occur outside the officer’s presence is a
violation of the U.S. and Idaho Constitution. I can’t go there. Supreme Court’s not
been too kind to district judges lately in their opinions, and I can’t imagine what
they would say about me if I were to be the first to go there, so I’m not going to,
so [defense counsel], if you’d be kind enough to prepare a quick order to that
effect denying the suppression motion, and the case will remain set to trial.2
(Tr., p.45, Ls.6–19.)
Just  prior to trial,  the State moved to dismiss the charge of misdemeanor battery due to
insufficient evidence. (R., p.118.) The district court granted the motion and ordered the charge
dismissed. (R., p.120.) The State filed an Amended Information with the three remaining
charges—felony possession of methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.122–23; see generally Tr., p.46, L.1–p.199,
L.9 (trial transcript).)
At  trial,  the  State  called  just  two  witnesses:  Officer  Hanson  and  an  Idaho  State  Police
Forensic Laboratory analytical chemist. (Tr., p.129, L.10–p.149, L.15, p.150, L.1–p.161, L.24,
p.162, L.4–p.164, L.14.) On the possession of methamphetamine charge, Officer Hanson
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testified that he found a syringe in Mr. Clarke’s shoe after he had taken Mr. Clarke to jail.3
(Tr., p.138, L.1–p.141, L.21.) Officer Hanson further testified that he removed the syringe from
the shoe and saw a white substance inside, which appeared to be methamphetamine. (Tr., p.141,
L.22–p.142, L.8.) He said that he took the plunger out of the syringe and a single white
crystallized chunk fell out. (Tr., p.142, Ls.9–23.) The single, solid piece was so small that it did
not register on Officer Hanson’s scale.4 (Tr., p.147, Ls.14–24.) In his opinion, it was “a trace
amount.” (Tr., p.147, Ls.20–21, p.147, L.25–p.148, L.2.) Next, the analytical chemist testified
that the trace amount substance contained methamphetamine. (Tr., p.156, L.23–p.157, L.8.) The
jury found Mr. Clarke guilty of all three offenses. (Tr., p.194, L.15–p.195, L.10; Aug. R., Jury
Verdict.)
For  possession  of  methamphetamine,  the  district  court  sentenced  Mr.  Clarke  to  four
years, with two years fixed, suspended execution of his sentence, and placed him on probation
for three years. (R., pp.179–81; Tr., p.233, L.24–p.234, L.8.) For the two misdemeanor offenses,
the district court sentenced Mr. Clarke to 180 days in jail, with 151 days suspended and credit for
29 days served, and two years of probation. (R., pp.177–78.) Mr. Clarke timely appealed from
the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.189–91.)
2 Although the district court requested a proposed order, no formal written order denying the
motion was filed.
3 There was no evidence presented on the “baggy containing several small chunks of a white
crystalline substance” that Officer Hanson reported to finding in Mr. Clarke’s backpack. (See
R., p.11; Tr., p.129, L.10–p.149, L.15, p.150, L.1–p.161, L.24, p.162, L.4–p.164, L.14.) The
State’s evidence to prove the possession of methamphetamine charge relied entirely on the trace
amount of methamphetamine in the syringe. (See Tr., p.124, L.13–p.126, L.22 (prosecutor’s
opening statement), p.181, L.25–p.184, L.6 (prosecutor’s closing argument).)
4 Officer  Hanson  said  his  scale  was  “not  a  very  sensitive  scale”  and  threshold  “might  be”  0.1
grams. (Tr., p.148, L.24–p.149, L.4.)
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ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress evidence obtained
following his warrantless arrest for an alleged misdemeanor committed outside the police
officer’s presence?
II. Did the State violate Mr. Clarke’s constitutional right to a fair trial when the prosecutor




The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Clarke’s Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained
Following His Warrantless Arrest For An Alleged Misdemeanor Committed Outside The
Police Officer’s Presence
A. Introduction
The Idaho Constitution prohibits a police officer from arresting an individual, without a
warrant, for a misdemeanor committed outside the officer’s presence. This Court recently
reaffirmed this long-standing principle, as well as the tenets of interpretation for the Idaho
Constitution itself, in State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884 (2015). Moreover, these warrantless arrests
are deemed unreasonable by not only the Idaho Constitution and Idaho’s appellate courts, but
also the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Here, the district court failed to apply these
state and federal constitutional standards when it denied Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress
evidence  obtained  from  Officer  Hanson’s  search  of  Mr.  Clarke  after  his  warrantless,
misdemeanor arrest. Because Officer Hanson violated Mr. Clarke’s state and federal
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures, the district court should have granted
Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress.
B. Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court
applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207
(2009). This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly  erroneous  but  will  freely  review  the  trial  court’s  application  of
constitutional principles to the facts found. Id. Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
State v. Lee, No. 44932, 2017 Opinion No. 103, p.4, 402 P.3d 1095, 1099–1100 (Idaho Sept. 22,
2017).
9
C. Officer Hanson’s Warrantless Arrest Of Mr. Clarke For An Alleged Completed
Misdemeanor Was An Unreasonable Seizure In Violation Of The Idaho And United
States Constitutions
The district court erred by denying Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress because state and
federal constitutional law both prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside
the officer’s presence (frequently referred to as “completed misdemeanors”). The Idaho
Constitution only grants police officers the authority to conduct warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors committed or attempted in their presence. If the misdemeanor did not occur in the
officer’s presence, the warrantless arrest violates the defendant’s Idaho constitutional rights, and
any evidence procured from the violation is must be excluded.  Likewise, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors and requires suppression of any
evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional right. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
not explicitly decided this issue, U.S. Supreme Court dicta, history, and traditional standards of
reasonableness all support this constitutional protection. Each constitutional protection will be
addressed in turn below.
1. The Idaho Constitution Prohibits Warrantless Arrests For Misdemeanors
Committed Outside The Police Officer’s Presence
Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states:
The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers  and  effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
IDAHO CONST.  art.  I,  §  17.  This  section  contains  “nearly  identical  guarantees”  as  those  in  the
Fourth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution. Green, 158 Idaho at 886.
Although Article 1, Section 17 and the Fourth Amendment are similar, Idaho’s appellate
courts “are not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourth
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Amendment.” State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 592 (Ct. App. 1995). As this Court recently
stated:
“The similarity of language and purpose . . . does not require this Court to follow
United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting our own constitution.”
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001). “Long gone are the days when state
courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and
methodology when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions.” Id.
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518 (2012). This Court is “at liberty to find within the provisions
of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471; see also State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987–88 (1992) (discussing this Court’s power to interpret the Idaho
Constitution independently and grant Idaho citizens more protection). As a result, this Court has
“construed Article I, section 17, to provide greater protection than is provided by the United
States Supreme Court’s construction of the Fourth Amendment” “[i]n some instances.” Koivu,
152 Idaho at 519. This Court provides “greater protection to Idaho citizens based on the
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence.” Id. (quoting
Donato, 135 Idaho at 472).
One instance of greater protection to Idaho citizens involves warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors. Generally, a warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the Idaho
Constitution, unless the State shows the seizure fits within a well-established exception to the
warrant requirement. Green, 158 Idaho at 886–87; see also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833
(2002) (“When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the
burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.”); State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). To determine whether a warrantless arrest is
reasonable under the Idaho Constitution, this Court  examines the statutory and common law in
11
effect at the time of the constitutional provision’s adoption. Green, 158 Idaho at 887–88 (citing
Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 55 (1946); see also IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 2 (“All laws now in
force in the territory of Idaho which are not repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force
until they expire by their own limitation or be altered or repealed by the legislature.”); State v.
Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 869 (1997) (stating substantive rights present in Idaho law prior to the
Idaho Constitution were “affirmed by Article XXI, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution”)). With
respect  to  warrantless  arrests  for  misdemeanors,  the  law  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the  Idaho
Constitution’s adoption flatly prohibited such arrests unless the misdemeanor was committed or
attempted in the officer’s presence. This prohibition of after-the-fact arrests for completed
misdemeanors is not truly unique to the State of Idaho,5 but nonetheless it provides its citizens
with greater protection and is supported by Idaho’s long-standing jurisprudence.
a. The law in effect at the time of the Idaho Constitution’s adoption barred
warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors
At the time of the adoption of the Idaho Constitution in 1890, “the law governing
warrantless arrests by peace officers in Idaho was found in Title III, Chapter V, Section 7540 of
the Idaho Revised Statutes.” Green, 158 Idaho at 888. It provided:
A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence;
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence;
5 “Thirty-eight states, and the District of Columbia, currently institute presence requirements
before an officer can make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor offense.” Justin Rhodes,
Common Law, Common Sense? How Federal Circuit Courts Have Misapplied the Fourth
Amendment and Why Officers Must be Present to Make a Warrantless Arrest for a Misdemeanor
Offense, 53 No. 4 CRIM. LAW BULL. art. 1 (2017).
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3.  When  a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person arrested to have committed it;
4. On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by
the party arrested;
5.  At  night,  when  there  is  reasonable  cause  to  believe  that  he  has  committed  a
felony.
Revised Statutes of the Territory of Idaho, Pt. 4 (Penal), Pt. 2 (Of Criminal Procedure), Title III,
Ch. V, § 7540 (1887) (emphasis added) (hereinafter, R.S. § 7540); see also Green, 158 Idaho at
888. “[A]rrests made under the circumstances specified in this statute should be accepted as
constitutionally reasonable under the Idaho Constitution.” Green, 158 Idaho at 888. For felony
offenses, this statute includes multiple specific circumstances for constitutionally reasonable
arrests. R.S. § 7540(2)–(5). But for a “public offense,” which includes a misdemeanor, there is
only one constitutionally permissible circumstance for a warrantless arrest:  “committed in [the
peace officer’s] presence.” R.S. § 7540(1); see also Green, 158 Idaho at 888 (citing to State v.
Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 940 (Ct. App. 1993), for principle that “public offense” includes
misdemeanors). “[A]n officer who arrests a person for a misdemeanor offense committed in the
officer’s presence has  made  a  reasonable  seizure  under  Article  I,  Section  17  of  the  Idaho
Constitution.” Green, 158 Idaho at 888 (emphasis added). As clearly laid out in R.S. § 7540, a
police officer may arrest an individual for a misdemeanor without a warrant, but only if the
offense occurred (or was attempted) in the officer’s presence.
b. The long-standing jurisprudence of Idaho’s appellate courts confirm this
constitutional prohibition on warrantless arrests for completed
misdemeanors
This in-the-presence requirement has been repeatedly and consistently referenced by
Idaho’s appellate courts. In 1945, this Court examined the statute and stated, “From which it
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would appear that in the case of misdemeanors, an arrest without a warrant can only be made
when the offense is committed or attempted in the officer’s presence.” State v. Hart, 66 Idaho
217, 223 (1945).6 In 1987, the Court of Appeals recognized that a police officer “had no
authority to make a warrantless arrest for misdemeanor offenses committed outside his
presence.” State v. Simpson, 112 Idaho 644, 646 (Ct. App. 1987).7 Similarly, in 1989, the Court
of Appeals noted, “Although there are exceptions not applicable here, generally, an officer
without  a  warrant  can  lawfully  arrest  a  person  for  a  misdemeanor  only  when  the  offense  is
“committed or attempted in his presence.” State v. Rodriguez, 115 Idaho 1096, 1098 (Ct. App.
1989) (citing I.C. § 19-603(1); State v. Simpson, 112 Idaho 644, (Ct. App. 1987)); see also
State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that Idaho codified the common
law allowing an officer to “make a warrantless arrest for any crime, whether a felony or a
6 The Green Court reasoned:
Though the Court in Hart does not expressly mention Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho  Constitution,  an  analysis  under  that  authority  is  implied  because  the  case
discusses only the Idaho Constitution and not the Federal Constitution and
because the remedy discussed in that case was suppression of evidence, which
applies only to constitutional violations unless otherwise specified by statute.
Therefore, when the Hart Court considered whether the arrest was unlawful, it
was presumably doing so to determine whether there was a reasonable search and
seizure under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
Green, 158 Idaho at 888 n.5.
7 The Simpson Court cited to I.C. § 19-603 for this proposition, which, at the time, allowed an
officer to make a warrantless arrest
[w]hen at the scene of a domestic disturbance there is reasonable cause to believe,
based upon physical evidence observed by the officer or statements made in the
presence of the officers upon immediate response to a report of a commission of
such a crime, that the person arrested has committed an assault or battery.
1979 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 307, § 1, p.832. The misdemeanor offenses at issue in Simpson
concerned the operation of boats. 112 Idaho at 646.
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misdemeanor, committed in his presence”). In 1993, the Court of Appeals stated, “If the
misdemeanor is not committed in the officer’s presence, however, the officer must obtain a
warrant before making the arrest.” State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 940 (Ct. App. 1993). This
case law confirms that the commission (or attempt) of the misdemeanor in the officer’s presence
is a well-established prerequisite in order for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest to be reasonable
and thus lawful under the Idaho Constitution.
c. The Legislature’s statutory amendment allowing warrantless arrests for
certain completed misdemeanors does not eliminate Idaho’s constitutional
protections
To be sure, the Legislature has amended R.S. § 7540 since the Idaho Constitution’s
adoption in 1890. The current version of R.S. § 7540 is codified at I.C. § 19-603. Notably, the
“traditional warrantless arrest standards” contained in provisions (1) through (5) of R.S. § 7540
have not been changed.8 Green, 158 Idaho at 888 n.4. However, the Legislature added two other
circumstances permitting warrantless arrests. I.C. § 19-603(6)–(7). Relevant here, the Legislature
added that a police officer could arrest an individual, without a warrant, “[w]hen upon immediate
response to a report of a commission of a crime there is probable cause to believe, that the person
arrested has committed” specific misdemeanors against another person, such as assault, stalking,
and battery (the alleged misdemeanor here).9 I.C. § 19-603(6). But, although this statutory
amendment gives police officers the limited statutory authority to arrest without a warrant for
8 In fact, the first five circumstances in R.S. § 7540, including “[f]or a public offense committed
or attempted in his presence,” were in effect as early as 1864. Statutes of the Territory of Idaho,
Criminal Practice Act, Part III (Complaint, and Proceedings Thereon to the Commitment,
Inclusive) §§ 130, 133 (1864).
9 The Legislature also added that a police officer could arrest a person without a warrant for
crimes committed on an aircraft. I.C. § 19-603(7).
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certain misdemeanors, the constitutional protections remain intact. This Court recognized the
disparity between the statutory and constitutional standards for warrantless arrests in Green:
[T]he enactments and amendments of these statutes were not required to be made
through the same rigorous standard as an amendment to the Idaho Constitution.
See IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1. Because these subsequently enacted arrest
standards did not exist at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted, and
because they were not incorporated by constitutional amendment, they cannot be
considered part of the constitutional standard for what constitutes a reasonable
seizure of the person. To hold otherwise would essentially allow the Legislature
to amend the Idaho Constitution by the process of a statutory enactment or
amendment.
158 Idaho at 888–89. Therefore, the Legislature’s subsequent enactment of a statutory
amendment allowing warrantless arrests for certain completed misdemeanors, including battery,
does not and cannot diminish Idaho’s constitutional protections.
d. The district court should have granted Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress
because the Idaho Constitution prohibited his warrantless arrest for a
completed misdemeanor
In light of this greater protection to Idaho citizens from warrantless arrests, Mr. Clarke’s
arrest was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 17 of Idaho Constitution. Officer Hanson
arrested Mr. Clarke, without a warrant, for a completed misdemeanor hours after the offense
allegedly occurred. (See Tr., p.18, L.14–p.19, L.7, p.25, Ls.7–9.) The offense was not committed
or attempted in Officer Hanson’s presence, which is required by the Idaho Constitution for a
constitutionally reasonable warrantless misdemeanor arrest. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.8–10.) And, even
though Mr. Clarke’s arrest complied with the statutory amendment contained in I.C. § 19-603(6),
Officer Hanson’s statutory compliance has no bearing on “the constitutional standard for what
constitutes a reasonable seizure of the person.” Green, 158 Idaho at 889–89. Mr. Clarke’s seizure
was still unreasonable under Article 1, Section 17 and therefore violated his state constitutional
rights.
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Due to the unconstitutional arrest, all evidence obtained from Officer Hanson’s search
incident to Mr. Clarke’s arrest and his later search at the jail must be suppressed. “The value of
the exclusionary rule was recognized by this Court long before the United States Supreme Court
required it for fourth amendment violations.” State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 592 (1978). In 1992,
this Court recognized, “Idaho has had an independent exclusionary rule based upon the state
constitution for the past sixty-five years.” Guzman, 122 Idaho at 991. “Idaho had clearly
developed an exclusionary rule as a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and
seizures in addition to other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule
as a deterrent for police misconduct.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 472. “The rule is well settled in this
state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant’s constitutional immunity from search and
seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if request for its suppression be timely made.”
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 516 (quoting State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 703 (1939)); see also Rauch, 99
Idaho at 592–93 (same). Accordingly, Idaho’s independent exclusionary rule requires
suppression of the evidence procured in violation of Mr. Clarke’s state constitutional rights.
Officer Hanson would not have found the evidence in Mr. Clarke’s backpack and on his person
but for the unlawful arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)
(discussing “the fruit of the poisonous tree” under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule);
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810–11 (2009) (same). Therefore, the district court erred when it
denied Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress. Mr. Clarke respectfully requests this Court reverse the
district court’s suppression ruling.
2. The  Fourth  Amendment  Prohibits  Warrantless  Arrests  For  Misdemeanors
Committed Outside The Police Officer’s Presence
Although this Court can resolve this issue on state constitutional grounds, the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also prohibits police officers from conducting warrantless
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arrests for misdemeanors committed outside the officers’ presence. Thus, in the alternative,
Mr. Clarke argues his warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly  describing  the  place  to  be  searched,  and  the  persons  or  things  to  be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 419 (2014). “When seizure occurs
without a warrant, the government bears the burden of proving facts necessary to establish an
exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920 (2007).
“In  the  context  of  the  Federal  Constitution  and  its  interpreting  case  law,  an  arrest  is
‘lawful’ if ‘officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their
presence’ even if such an arrest does not comply with state statutes governing arrests.” Green,
158 Idaho at 887 (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174–78 (2008)). However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has explicitly declined to “speculate whether the Fourth Amendment entails an
‘in the presence’ requirement for purposes of misdemeanor arrests.” Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 341 n.11 (2001).10 Even  though it  is  an  open  question,  the  U.S.  Supreme
10 In this footnote, the U.S. Supreme Court cited to and quoted parenthetically from Justice
White’s dissent in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984): “[T]he requirement that a
misdemeanor  must  have  occurred  in  the  officer’s  presence  to  justify  a  warrantless  arrest  is  not
grounded in the Fourth Amendment.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 341 n.11 (quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at
756 (White, J., dissenting)). But see Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 614 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“That crime, like the others, was only a misdemeanor, and no arrest
can be made for a misdemeanor without a warrant unless it be committed in the presence of
officers.”). A majority of federal circuit courts have held the Fourth Amendment does not
mandate the “in-the-presence” condition; however, all but one of these cases are federal civil
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Court’s dicta since 1885, history from the Framing era, and traditional standards of
reasonableness all lead to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment entails an in-the-presence
requirement for warrantless misdemeanor arrests.
a. Dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court strongly suggests the U.S. Supreme
Court would hold the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless arrests for
completed misdemeanors
For over a century, U.S. Supreme Court dicta has supported the position that warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors are only reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the misdemeanor
was committed in the police officer’s presence. As early at 1885, the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
By the common law of England, neither a civil officer nor a private citizen had
the  right,  without  a  warrant,  to  make  an  arrest  for  a  crime not  committed  in  his
presence, except in the case of felony, and then only for the purpose of bringing
the offender before a civil magistrate.
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498–99 (1885). Fifteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized, “So an officer, at common law, was not authorized to make an arrest without a
warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not committed in his presence.” Bad Elk v. United States, 177
U.S. 529, 534 (1900). In Carroll v. United States,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  again  noted,  “The
usual  rule  is  that  a  police  officer  may arrest  without  warrant  one  believed  by  the  officer  upon
reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony, and that he may only arrest without a warrant
one guilty of a misdemeanor if committed in his presence.” 267 U.S. 132, 156–575 (1925)
(citing Kurtz, 115 U.S. 487; Bad Elk, 177 U.S. 529). About fifty years later, in United States v.
Watson, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient common-law
rule  that  a  peace  officer  was  permitted  to  arrest  without  a  warrant  for  a
rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Graves v. Mahoning Cnty., 821 F.3d 772, 778–80 (6th
Cir. 2016) (collecting cases, discussing arguments on both sides, and indicating a willingness to
revisit its precedent).
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misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.
423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); accord Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 n.30 (1980). More
recently, in Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned, “If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Id. at 354.
A couple of years later, in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court
reiterated, “A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor
committed in the officer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is
supported by probable cause.” Id. at 370. The U.S. Supreme Court repeated this principle in
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008): “In a long line of cases, we have said that when an
officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the
balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.” Id. at 171. Therefore, while the U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
issue, the U.S. Supreme Court has said time and time again that a lawful warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor requires that the offense occurs in the officer’s presence.
b. History proves the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve the norm
prohibiting warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors
Along with the U.S. Supreme Court’s continued reference to this principle, Framing-era
common law supports this Fourth Amendment interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court “begin[s]
with history” to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Moore,  553  U.S.  at
168.  The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  looks  “to  the  statutes  and  common  law  of  the  founding  era  to
determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.” Id. (citing Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995)). If history
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“yields no answer,” then the U.S. Supreme Court “must evaluate the search or seizure under
traditional standards of reasonableness . . . .” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300; accord Moore,
553 U.S. at 171.
Here, it is unnecessary to evaluate the traditional reasonableness standards because
history is conclusive. Under the common law, warrantless arrests for misdemeanors were
prohibited unless the misdemeanor occurred in the officer’s presence. See Watson, 423 U.S. at
418 (“ancient common-law rule”) (citing 10 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 344–45 (3d ed.
1955); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292; 1 J. STEPHEN,  A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (1883); 2 M. HALE,  PLEAS OF THE CROWN *72–74; Wilgus, Arrest
Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 547–50, 686–88 (1924); Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug.
359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780); Beckwith v. Philby, 6 Barn. & Cress. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585
(K.B. 1827)); see also Kurtz 115 U.S. at 498–99 (“the common law of England”); Bad Elk, 177
U.S. at 534 (“at common law”); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156–575 (“usual rule”). “This has also been
the prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes.” Watson,  423  U.S.  at  419.  “The  rule
barring warrantless misdemeanor arrests originated in England. In 1710, in Regina v. Tooley, [2
Lord Raymond 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (1710),] Lord Holt summarized the English rule with the
statement that ‘a constable cannot arrest, but when he sees an actual breach of the peace; and if
the affray be over, he cannot arrest.’” William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests
and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 788 (1993) (quoting Regina, 2 Lord Raymond
at 1301, 92 Eng. Rep. at 352) (footnotes omitted). Similar to the English common law, early
American common law barred warrantless misdemeanor arrests unless the misdemeanor was
committed in the police officer’s presence. During the Framing era, the common law
justifications for any warrantless arrest were very limited. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
21
Original Fourth Amendment,  98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 627–34 (1999). Warrantless misdemeanor
arrests in the presence of the police officer, or “on view,” was one of these narrow justifications:
The “on view” justification . . . was the only justification for a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest. Common law did not provide any justification for making a
warrantless misdemeanor arrest after-the-fact; in that case, only a judicial arrest
warrant could justify the arrest. This limitation was significant because many
serious crimes (that are now felonies) were misdemeanors at common law.
The restriction against making warrantless misdemeanor arrests after-the-
fact meant that even a person guilty of a completed misdemeanor could lawfully
resist a constable’s attempt to make a warrantless arrest for that offense. Likewise,
even a convicted misdemeanant could bring a trespass action against an officer
who had arrested him after-the-fact without a valid arrest warrant. Because it was
more important to apprehend felons than misdemeanants, the common law
provided somewhat broader justifications for felony arrests. . . .
Id. at 630–31 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). As shown by these authorities, history
provides a definitive answer:  the Fourth Amendment preserved the common law “norm” barring
warrantless misdemeanor arrests unless the misdemeanor was committed in the police officer’s
presence. See Moore, 553 U.S. at 168.
c. Traditional standards of reasonableness render warrantless arrests for
completed misdemeanors unreasonable because the severe intrusion on an
individual’s privacy outweighs the State’s interests
Even if history was inconclusive, the traditional standards of reasonableness would
prohibit warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors. “When history has not provided a
conclusive answer,” the U.S. Supreme Court analyzes “a search or seizure in light of traditional
standards of reasonableness ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon
an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.’” Moore, 553 U.S. at 171 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at
300).  On  the  reasonableness  of  misdemeanor  arrests  generally,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  has
recognized, “When the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that
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presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be
allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and
detached magistrate.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (footnote omitted) (holding
warrantless, nighttime arrest in defendant’s home for traffic infraction unconstitutional). Here, a
warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor is unreasonable in light of the invasiveness of
the arrest upon an individual’s privacy and the minimal necessity of these types of arrests to
promote the State’s interests.
On the one hand, the State’s interest in arresting an individual suspected of committing a
completed misdemeanor is low. “[T]he penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to
provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State’s interest in arresting individuals
suspected of committing that offense.” Id. at 754 n.14. In Idaho, the default penalty for a
misdemeanor is, at most, six months in county jail or a $1,000 fine.11 I.C. § 18-113. This lesser
penalty provides the “clearest and most consistent” indication of the State’s level of interest.
Moreover, the State’s interest in the protection of society is greatly reduced in these situations.
By its very nature, a completed misdemeanor has already occurred. The individual is no longer
committing the crime; the danger to the public has dissipated. The police officer, upon receiving
the report of the crime after-the-fact, can immediately apply for a warrant and, if granted, arrest
the individual. This procedure ensures the State can investigate the crime and protect the public
from future harm, while also diminishing the risk of an erroneous arrest. Thus, the degree to
which  a  warrantless  arrest  for  a  completed  misdemeanor  is  needed  for  the  promotion  of  the
State’s legitimate interests is low.
11 The penalty for the misdemeanor battery charged here is the same:  a maximum of six months
in jail or a $1,000 fine. I.C. § 18-904.
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On the other hand, the degree to which a warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor
intrudes  on  an  individual’s  privacy  is  high.  A  full  custodial  arrest  is  a  “severe  intrusion  on  an
individual’s liberty.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 365 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). An arrest is far more
invasive than a stop-and-frisk or a traffic stop. “An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion
upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons,” and “it is inevitably accompanied
by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether or not trial or
conviction ultimately follows.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
A search may cause only annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the law-
abiding citizen, assuming more serious dimension only when it turns up evidence
of criminality. An arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless of
whether the person seized is guilty or innocent. Although an arrestee cannot be
held for a significant period without some neutral determination that there are
grounds to do so, . . . no decision that he should go free can come quickly enough
to erase the invasion of his privacy that already will have occurred.
Watson, 423 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted). “[T]he custodial arrest itself
represents a significant intrusion into the privacy of the person.” United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Even a brief period of custody “exacts an obvious toll on an individual’s liberty and
privacy.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The individual and his or her
possessions can be searched by the police. State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838 (2004) (search
incident to arrest exception). If the individual was in a vehicle, the police may be able to search
the vehicle as well. State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513–16 (2010) (search of vehicle incident
to arrest exception). The individual is handcuffed, put in the back of a locked police car, and
taken to jail. Booking procedures can include fingerprinting, a mug shot,12 and potentially a more
12 For example, the Ada County Sheriff’s Office maintains a website where anyone can view the
name, age, charge, and mug shot of any arrestee from the last five days. See Current Arrests,
available at https://adasheriff.org/webapps/sheriff/reports/.
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invasive body search. See I.C. § 67-3004 (requiring fingerprinting upon arrest). In Idaho, an
individual can be held up to twenty-four hours (excluding weekends and holidays) before his or
her first appearance before a magistrate. I.C. § 19-615; Idaho Criminal Rule 5(b). All of these
components of a custodial arrest—physical restraint, multiples searches, fingerprinting,
photographs, and pre-trial detention—demonstrate the immense degree to which an arrest
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.
On balance, the intrusion upon an individual’s privacy from an arrest substantially
outweighs the State’s interest in foregoing a warrant and arresting an individual after-the-fact for
a completed misdemeanor. Accordingly, the traditional standards of reasonableness support a
determination that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless arrests for misdemeanors
committed outside the police officer’s presence.
d. In the alternative, the district court should have granted Mr. Clarke’s
motion to suppress because the Fourth Amendment prohibited his
warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor
The  Fourth  Amendment  includes  an  in-the  presence  requirement  for  the  warrantless
arrest of a misdemeanor. Century-old U.S. Supreme Court dicta, applicable history from the
Framing era, and traditional standards of reasonableness all stand for this constitutional
protection. Therefore, if this Court should address this issue, Mr. Clarke asserts the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds. Officer Hanson’s
warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor violated Mr. Clarke’s Fourth Amendment rights.
All evidence obtained from the search incident to Mr. Clarke’s arrest and his search at the jail
was the fruit of the unlawful arrest. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88 (“the fruit of the
poisonous tree”); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810–11 (same). The district court should have suppressed
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this evidence. Therefore, Mr. Clarke respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress.
II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct And Thereby Violated Mr. Clarke’s Right To A Fair
Trial By Misstating The Evidence In Her Closing Argument
A. Introduction
Mr. Clarke contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the evidence in
her closing argument on the key, contested element at trial:  whether Mr. Clarke had knowledge
of the trace amount of methamphetamine in the syringe in his shoe. The prosecutor misstated the
evidence twice—once in her initial closing argument and once on rebuttal. Mr. Clarke objected
to the second misrepresentation, but not the first. He contends these misrepresentations violated
his constitutional right to a fair trial, and these errors were not harmless.
B. Standard Of Review
If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial,
appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test articulated in Chapman [v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)]. Where the defendant meets his initial burden of
showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating
to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation
did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). If the error was unpreserved, this Court reviews the
error under the fundamental error standard. Id. at 228. Under this standard, the defendant has the
burden to show the error “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Id.
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C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Because She Misstated The Evidence On The
Dispositive,  Contested  Element  Of  The  Felony  Charge  Two  Separate  Times  In  Her
Closing Argument
“[E]very defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and ‘[i]t is
axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” Perry, 150
Idaho at 224 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009)). “Prosecutorial misconduct may so infect the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.” State v. Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466, 472 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho
331, 344 (Ct. App. 2008)). “As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that defendants
receive fair trials.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715 (2009) (citing State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho
35, 43–44 (1903)). “They  should  not  ‘exert  their  skill  and  ingenuity  to  see  how  far  they  can
trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights
of the accused.’” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 144 (2014) (quoting State v. Christiansen, 144
Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (alteration in original)). “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict
on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts
a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Closing  argument  is  an  opportunity  for  the  attorneys  on  each  side  to
clarify the issues that must be resolved by the jury; to review the evidence and
discuss, from the parties’ respective standpoints, the inferences that jurors should
draw  therefrom;  and  to  discuss  the  law  set  forth  in  the  jury  instructions  as  it
applies to the trial evidence.
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576
(Ct. App. 2007)). “Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing
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argument to the jury . . . .” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003). “Considerable latitude,
however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those implied.” State v. Phillips, 144
Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). “Urgings, explicit or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based
on factors other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law contained in the jury instructions
have no place in closing arguments.” Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685 (quoting Beebe, 145 Idaho at
576)).
“It  is  plainly  improper  for  a  party  to  present  closing  argument  that  misrepresents  or
mischaracterizes the evidence.” Beebe, 145 Idaho at 575; see also State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho
477, ___, 399 P.3d 804, 829 (2017) (same). “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid
misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” Lankford, 162 Idaho at
___, 399 P.3d at 829 (quoting State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)).
Here, the only contested element for the possession of methamphetamine charge was
Mr. Clarke’s knowledge. In defense counsel’s opening statement, he informed the jury that they
would not “hear much argument” about the marijuana, paraphernalia, and the syringe in
Mr. Clark’s shoe. (Tr., p.127, Ls.11–20.) Instead, defense counsel challenged Mr. Clarke’s
knowledge of the methamphetamine and questioned whether the State would meet its burden of
proof.  (Tr., p.127, L.20–p.129, L.4.) After the presentation of evidence, the prosecutor addressed
the knowledge element in her closing argument. She stated:
Mr. Clarke – as [defense counsel] said, the issue that you might be concerned with
is  knowledge.  Did  Mr.  Clarke  know  this  was  there?  Did  he  know  it  was  a
controlled substance? Of course he did. That’s why he didn’t admit it ‘til he got to
the jail. That’s why it was hidden in his shoe. That’s why he didn’t say it until
Deputy Hanson said can’t bring drugs in here, and then he remembered, oh, yeah.
He didn’t want to be – he didn’t want to be found with that again.
(Tr., p.183, Ls.10–18 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel did not object at this time. Next, in
defense counsel’s closing argument, he conceded that Mr. Clarke knew he had a syringe in his
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shoe, but he disputed whether Mr. Clarke had knowledge of the trace amount of
methamphetamine inside the syringe. (See Tr., p.184, Ls.9–21, p.185, L.24–p.1, p.188, Ls.17–
19.) He argued the State did not prove this essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. (See
Tr., p.184, L.21–p.189, L.3.) The prosecutor then began her rebuttal by stating, “Did Mr. Clarke
know this was methamphetamine?” (Tr., p.189, Ls.6–7.) She discussed defense counsel’s
“version” of how Mr. Clarke came to have the syringe in his shoe. (Tr., p.189, Ls.8–17.) After
that, she argued:
He kept it hidden in his shoe because he didn’t want the deputy to find it. He was
already being arrested. He had – the deputy had already found marijuana.13 . . . He
was already being arrested. He was already being taken to jail. He’d already been
found with marijuana and syringes, and it’s not until the deputy’s bringing him in,
asks about controlled substances, asks him about drugs specifically –
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. I believe the testimony was he
asked if he had anything illegal, not if he had any illegal drugs.
THE COURT: That objection’s overruled.
[PROSECUTOR]: That is when Mr. Clarke decided to say there’s something in
there, I remember now, there’s a syringe in my shoe. Ladies and gentlemen, we
can never tell what someone’s thinking, right? That’s not what you can do. That’s
not what I can do. We don’t know what’s running through someone’s mind, but
what we do know is look at the circumstances. We look at everything about this
circumstance, and everything here indicates that he knew there was a legal –
illegal controlled substance in his shoe. He was standing on it, and that’s why he
hid it.
(Tr., p.189, L.14–p.190, L.18 (emphasis added).) Thus, the prosecutor first told the jury that
Officer Hanson told Mr. Clarke he could not have “drugs” in the jail. Second, she told the jury
that Mr. Clarke elected to tell Officer Hanson there was a syringe in his shoe after Officer
Hanson asked him about “controlled substances” and “drugs specifically” on his person. This
13 Immediately after this statement, defense counsel made a separate objection, which is not at
issue here.
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evidence, according to the prosecutor, satisfied her burden to prove Mr. Clarke’s knowledge of
the methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both of these statements—that Officer Hanson told Mr. Clark “can’t bring drugs in here”
and asked Mr. Clarke about “controlled substances” and “drugs specifically”—were
misrepresentations of the evidence. Officer Hanson did not tell or ask Mr. Clarke about drugs or
controlled substances. When asked by the prosecutor to describe “generally what happens when
someone’s brought to jail,” Officer Hanson testified:
I always inform them if they have anything illegal on them that I haven’t located,
uh, that could be an additional felony charge if they introduce it into a secure
facility. In this case I advised Mr. Clarke if he had anything illegal that  I  had
missed that he still had on him to advise me of that.
(Tr., p.138, Ls.7–15 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor followed up on this procedure by asking
Officer Hanson:
Q. So as you’re walking Mr. Clarke in did you ask him any questions?
A. I did.
Q. What did you ask him?
A. If he had anything illegal on him that the jail deputies might find on him.
Q. And what did he do then in response?
A. He began limping.
Q. Did he say anything?
A. I asked him why he was limping, and he said he felt there was a rock in his
shoe.
(Tr., p.138, L.23–p.139, L.3 (emphasis added).) “Anything illegal” is not “controlled substances”
and “drugs specifically.” Anything illegal means any unlawful item, such as paraphernalia or a
weapon. It is certainly not limited to drugs. The prosecutor had a duty to avoid a
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misrepresentation  of  the  evidence,  and  she  failed  that  duty  twice. Lankford, 162 Idaho at ___,
399 P.3d at 829. Under the fundamental error standard for the first misstatement and the
harmless error standard for the second, Mr. Clarke has meet his burden to show a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and a fair trial because the prosecutor committed misconduct
by misrepresenting Officer Hanson’s testimony to the jury.
For the first, unobjected-to misstatement (“can’t bring drugs in here”), this constitutional
violation is clear and plain from the record. This Court recently reaffirmed, “It is improper to
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” Lankford, 162 Idaho at ___,
399 P.3d at 829 (2017) (quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)). This
Court has identified the prosecutor’s “duty to avoid a misrepresentation of the facts” for over
thirty years. State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980) (holding that a prosecutor’s closing
statements were improper because they were “unsustained by the record”), overruled on other
grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 (1981). There is no tactical or strategic reason for
defense counsel to fail to object to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence on the only
contested element at trial, especially considering that defense counsel did object later on to a
similar misstatement in the prosecutor’s rebuttal. Defense counsel gains no benefit or advantage
by allowing the prosecutor—who occupies an official position that necessarily leads jurors to
give more credence to her statements—to misrepresent evidence to the jury. See State v. Irwin, 9
Idaho 35, 43–44 (1903). Mr. Clarke has met his burden to show a violation of his unwaived
constitutional right to a fair trial plainly exists from the first misstatement.
Moreover, each of the prosecutor’s misrepresentations prejudiced Mr. Clarke. For the
first misstatement, Mr. Clarke has the burden to show “there is a reasonable possibility that the
error affected the outcome of the trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Here, the prosecutor’s
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misrepresentation was highly relevant, if not dispositive, on the contested issue of Mr. Clarke’s
knowledge of the methamphetamine inside the syringe. According to the prosecutor, Mr. Clarke
did not say anything about the syringe until Officer Hanson told him that he “can’t bring drugs”
in the jail. The prosecutor argued Mr. Clarke’s admission at that very moment, precipitated by
Officer Hanson’s “drugs” statement, proved Mr. Clarke’s knowledge of the methamphetamine.
This misrepresentation plainly bolsters the State’s case. It supports a finding by the jury that
Mr. Clarke had knowledge of the specific substance inside his shoe. On the other hand, the actual
evidence at trial showed only that Mr. Clarke admitted to having “a rock” in his shoe after
Officer Hanson asked him if he had “anything illegal” on him. (Tr., p.138, L.23–p.139, L.3.)
This evidence supports a finding that Mr. Clarke had knowledge of the syringe, but not
necessarily what was inside. Mr. Clark’s admission to knowledge of the syringe only is entirely
reasonable because, at this point, Mr. Clarke had already been arrested for possession of drug
paraphernalia. He was aware that paraphernalia qualified as “anything illegal.” As such, the jury
could have reasonably inferred Mr. Clarke made the admission not because he knew of the
substance inside the syringe but because he understood the syringe itself to be illegal. Therefore,
Mr. Clarke has shown there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s misrepresentation on
the only contested element at trial affected the outcome.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s second misstatement had a similar prejudicial effect, and the
State cannot meet its burden to show this error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Perry, 150
Idaho at 227. Again, according to the prosecutor’s misstatement, Mr. Clarke was asked if he had
“controlled substances” or “drugs specifically” on him, and “[t]hat is when Mr. Clarke decided to
say there’s something in there, I remember now, there’s a syringe in my shoe.” (Tr., p.190, Ls.8–
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10.) This too bolsters the State’s case with misrepresented evidence. The State cannot show this
error was harmless.
In summary, the prosecutor committed misconduct in her closing argument by
misrepresenting the evidence two separate times to the jury. This misconduct violated
Mr. Clarke’s unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial. For the first misstatement, which was
not objected-to, the error is obvious from the record and was not harmless. For the second
misstatement, the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was harmless.
Based on either or both instance of prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. Clarke respectfully requests
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
On the  motion  to  suppress  issue,  Mr.  Clarke  respectfully  requests  this  Court  reverse  or
vacate the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, vacate the judgment of
conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, on the prosecutorial
misconduct issue, Mr. Clarke respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction
and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2017.
___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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